work as your own. It is usually associated, too, with little or no acknowledgement of the borrowing and the source. Students do it, academic staff do it, writers do it, scientists do it, but we should not do it. And there is a price to pay. But maybe things are not as simple.
Plagiarism and reactionism Cormeny (1996) defines plagiarism as using the words or phrases of another person and restating another's thoughts in slightly different words.``For instance'', she says,``it is plagiarism to take credit for Shakespeare's To be, or not to be: That is the question.' It's also a plagiarism to modify his sentence without credit to`The question is: to be, or not to be.''' Clearly, we can be guilty of plagiarism (or plagiary) even if the``original'' material is out of copyright in the public domain. You can quote people, but acknowledge the quotation. You can paraphrase people, but acknowledge the source and take care to ensure your words or expressions are not``too heavily'' dependent on the source,``too like'' the original. This is why, in academic policies in schools and colleges and universities, students are advised to``cite'' their sources, and why guidebooks for literary and scientific authors emphasise the importance of citing sources.
All this presupposes a paradigm in which the creative and original status of thè`a uthor'' matters, and needs to be recognised for a variety of social, intellectual, economic, and moral reasons. It also draws on a wide set of assumptions and procedures about academic behaviour. Misconduct in academic, intellectual, authorly, scientific activity shows itself in various forms of deception and crime. We see it when accountants cook the books, software phreeks mimic computer programmes, writers pass off work by others as their own, students produce patchwork quilts of unacknowledged borrowings for their assignment, scientists invent data, and research students lean too heavily on evidence they think, or hope, will not be detected.
These examples all demonstrate forms of misconduct, professional and academic. A common theme is cheating. Cheating entails deception, an area of social and professional life full of independent interest to sociologists and psychologists. We lie to others for reasons good and bad, we lie to avoid punishment and to achieve particular goals, we even lie to ourselves (self-deception). Deception and lying are influenced by the cultural and moral context, presuppose the existence and desirability of honesty and openness, and come in degrees of seriousness, from white lies to serious deception. Many people find lying difficult. Many people do not presume deception in everyday life. When we detect it, or face the possibility in ourselves, a familiar social and moral reaction is caution, reserve, suspicion, shame, embarrassment, fear of detection, resentment at being deceived. All these reactions are commonplace in everyday life (Lewis and Saarni, 1993) , and they are equally likely in professional and institutional life as well.
It is the mixture of law or rule-breaking and social misrepresentation and deception that gives plagiarism is bitter taste. Editors are gatekeepers and need to keep a vigilant eye on matters of intellectual integrity, honesty, and originality, for their own reputation as well as that of the journal, publisher, and institutions associated with peer review and editorial control. Universities wish to assert their right to be effective self-regulating entities, effectively policing or monitoring what students do on courses and what academic staff do in research.
Professional domains often have bodies or associations with codes of professional ethics which stress authenticity, confidentiality, integrity. Activities like plagiarism, then, are breaches not just of the rules (in the case of copyright, the law) but also of the norms, values, expectations, assumptions, and moral beliefs of whole communities. This is why such communities react in the complex ways they do, set up committees and panels of academic review and professional competence, aspire objectively and discreetly to differentiate between honest and dishonest material, and arrive at fair and accountable decisions. We can see this in studentuniversity policies where misconduct is concerned, and in decisions where academic deception has been found. Matters like these are often difficult, because evidence is not always factual, because plagiarism has a subjective dimension (what is a lot?), because defendants can argue that they have independently arrived at an idea or text, because intention to deceive is very hard to prove.
Where students are concerned, it is possible to argue that no economic damage has been done, and copying is, in a way, a form of learning. Things get even more complicated where people collaborate over texts, and ideas and portions of the text are hard to attribute. More and more texts are produced this way (say through the use of groupware in organisations, and hypermedia in teaching). Ownership is harder to attribute, particularly where cyberschool approaches are being developed and where curricular materials, including interactive materials, are becoming widespread.
The issues, then, are not simple. What's mine may not be yours but yours might well be mine ! I want to get on (say, in the publishor-perish tenure stakes) so anything goes? The risks of detection seem to be low. Getting my assignment in on time, my book completed, my research grant renewed, and much else, urges on honest and dishonest students, academics, writers, scientists, alike. In some cases, only fear of detection holds them back.
Many of the social and institutional structures within which these things occur, or are alleged to occur, close ranks when deception is detected, ostracise whistleblowers, exculpate themselves from responsibility and liability, and if pressed blame bureaucratic procedures. The very topic of plagiarism has a sensationalism of its own, enough to make a clear undistorted view of what is actually happening hard to obtain.
Gatekeepers and facilitators
One of the recurring challenges for academic institutions is that, where issues of plagiarism are concerned, they are caught between being gatekeepers and facilitators. As gatekeepers their role, arguably, is to encourage, instruct, oblige students to acknowledge and cite sources, recognise library and Internet materials for the copyright content they are, provide guidance in supervision and teaching on how to develop ideas and explanations of their own while at the same time working ethically within the intellectual and professional framework of their discipline.
Codes of academic conduct usually include guidance on plagiarism and the penalties it can lead to ± failure of an assignment, suspension from a course, and, in retrospect, possible revocation of an academic award. For academic staff, working under an employment contract between employer and employee, there are added legal and professional sanctions and obligations, such as loss of livelihood and reputation. Under contract law, too, there is the matter of substantial performance: an act of plagiarism by a member of academic staff may be regarded, contractually, as a failure to perform``substantially'' in this sense, an act in fact of under-or non-performance.
Students do not have such legally binding`c ontracts'' with their colleges and universities, although this has not prevented some, particularly in North America, going to law to pursue remedies for acts of alleged plagiarism which currently prevent them obtaining an award (a remedy for an executory contract) or which has, retrospectively, disallowed an award already obtained (a remedy for an executed contract). Concepts of the``contract'' between students and institutions has firmed up in recent years with good and bad results: the quasi-legal character of such contracts makes them hybrids between loose charters of good intent and firm statements of legal responsibility, performance and liability.
The proliferation of legal cases in the USA (documented by writers such as Mawdsley, (1994) ) suggests that both types of remedy may be sought more frequently. This makes it important to work out appropriate definitions and procedures for plagiarism. The other side of the role for academic institutions and lecturers, teachers, information specialists and librarians, system administrators and others, is that of facilitator.
This concept implies an understanding for the process of learning, and its implications for issues of originality and plagiarism. Students write a lot of essays, reports and other assignments, and, although few of them arguably attain a high enough standard of critical acumen and originality to sustain themselves against professionally published work, nonetheless they matter at the time to the person concerned, critical and creative factors matter, and marks are awarded for being relevant and incisive and authentic. As authors, too, they are rights-holders of the copyright (although this can be a vexatious area, since some would argue that, perhaps like employees, things are done in an institutional context and so ownership is shared).
As facilitators, the perspective can be said to change. Students are there to learn. An essential part of learning is becoming familiar with the ideas and writings of other people. Exemplars of other writing and research are widely provided and recommended. Reading lists specify specific books and articles and Websites. We should not therefore be surprised if students produce mosaics or patchworks of the writings of others. Following the classical notion, which persisted in the medieval period, that autonomous authorship was less important than imitation, and that imitation (or mimesis) was the way in which the best texts and ideas were perpetuated and disseminated (e.g. belief in God from the scriptoria of the monasteries), then, in the same spirit, student learning is of this kind. This serves to redefine plagiarism, taking it from direct and explicit`t heft'' to a form of``imitation'' or patchworking. Howard (1999) is one of several to argue for this approach to plagiarism. Traditional concepts of theft need to be recontextualised in learning so that the natural and ultimately harmless process of borrowing and integrating can be learned, incorporated into the professional critical apparatus of the graduate, and established as a basis for independent original thought and research which follows at higher levels of the degree programme or afterwards in professional life. What this argues for, essentially, is a different way of defining``originality''.
In this context, not necessarily the hagiographic view of the independent creative artist where genius and virtue combine, but, more pragmatically, a state of affairs where students and teachers collaborate in a process of learning where, among other things, learning to deal with sources and learning how to go through and beyond them are critical components of becoming a graduate. Such an approach need not exclude academic misconduct and plagiarism as such.
There are degrees of deception, levels of plagiarism, and some are blatant, evidentially provable, inequitable, and inexcusable. Examples might include where sources are used extensively, passed off as one's own, and the original source (say an article in a journal in the library) is stolen or destroyed; or where one student steals the work of another; or where students collude with each other, or cheat during an examination. Others come to light with dissertations and theses, where borrowings are clear, data are crudely or subtly adapted, and deception is consensually agreed to be intentional or deliberate.
The contested identity of author and text`D eliberate'' opens up a complex dimension of plagiarism because it goes to motivation or perceived intentionality. This can, unless confessed, only be a matter of conjecture and inference. Intentionality or mens rea presents problems in the law generally. Accusations of deliberate plagiarism are often met with the counter-rebuttal of inadvertence or innocent repetition, or false memory, or claims of something being in the public domain, or having been recalled from someone else a long time ago unattributably.
The notion that information or knowledge is``generally and publicly available'' is itself an interesting one, since one defence is to argue that the ideas and text derived from and represented``what is commonly known'', and is therefore not attributable to any particular author or text, and is therefore not plagiarism. So a defendant might argue that the idea of displacement or ozone depletion, exit counselling in the workplace or knowledge as an intangible asset, were and are ideas or concepts generally and public available, not the exclusive domain of one writer or text. This in turn introduces the issue of degree of borrowing, with the evidential and factual matter of looking at what is written and coming to a judgement about originality or plagiarism.
The deconstruction of the concept of thè`g enius and virtue'' author, as sole and autonomous creator, is itself of relevance here. Postmodernism has suggested that differences between high and low culture are artificial and illusory, while post-structuralism and deconstructionism have argued for the demolition of the traditional author, as the source of narrative structure and identity and truth, and of the text, as a structure canonically constructed by the narrator. Rather we are all authors, since texts are fluid and they are, like all discourse, socially constructed, collaboratively and interactively constructed. Bakhtin's (1981) work on discourse is one example of many where the context of the discourse has come to mean more than the content: text is collaboratively constructed. Where traditional conceptions of author and text undergo redefinition, then matters of intellectual property and plagiarism get changed too.
Postmodern and decontructivist ideas come together when we examine notions of originality and truth in the text. We come to see text as increasingly transient and protean, taking on different identities and functionalities with each new context. Contexts themselves are stripped of any canonical trappings so there remain no canonical readings of the text. Texts, including audio and video, media and multimedia, exist in a Baudrillardian hyperreality where the very act of looking becomes problematic in its own right. Readers can no longer trust to being readers, no one perspective is possible. Newsgroup collaboration on the Usenet suggests the very quintessence of collaborative text, with a fusion of text and meta-text, information and meta-information.
Texts become intertextual, made up of other texts, resonating with other texts, perhaps through textual conflation or through parody or pastiche. Meta-fiction specialises in this hall of mirrors effect. Even though, paradoxically, the text is a text is a text (i.e. an entity we can actually see in front of us, in a book, journal or on screen), the epistemological (truth-related) and axiological (value/belief-related) aspects of such texts has effectly redefined them so that`o ne text'' no longer becomes possible. Where intertextuality is widespread, then, and well-known for the readers and users of text, then it is no wonder that academic, intellectual property, and moral interpretations of the text have themselves changed. Texts become negotiated realities, not just in terms of narrative or scientific content, but also in terms of the mutual identities and relative positions of creators and users. Philosophically and textually, then, we have issues of contested identity.
To this may be added another critical factor, the growth of electronic forms of writing, narrative construction, and collaboration. Increasingly authorship and text are becoming provisional, created in order for others to add things to it and comment on it. The notion is not new, as peer-review and conference papers demonstrate. But the degree to which this is happening, and how authorship and text are being seen as a result, are interesting. Collaborative authorship has always been difficult where plagiarism is concerned: usually attempts are made, in cases of alleged deception, to attribute appropriate parts of a work to particular people, so that liability can be determined. For named chapters or sections in a monograph, this is easy. It is less easy when a supervisor adds her name to her research student's by-line on an academic paper, and even more so when an academic decides to rewrite/repackage a student's work for publication. Responsibility is often that of the``senior'' person but this does not always exist and issues of shame, secretiveness, reputation, anger and fear kick in when accusations are made.
To the philosophical and textual issues of contested identity we can add those associated with detection, attribution, institutional and community self-regulation, professional ethics and relationships. In evidential and legal terms, too, it is often difficult to pin down responsibility. Plagiarisms are often difficult if not impossible to detect, especially in the electronic domain. Even with search engines, spiders, and a knowledge of commerciallyavailable essay and report Websites like Cheater.com and termpapers-on-file.com, detection and evidence of plagiarism are hard to prove. Allegations are risky and have led in some places to allegations of discrimination and defamation. Proving intentionality or`d eliberate'' deception is harder still, however easy it might appear to be to spot motivations for any misconduct.
The very process of collaboration on the text is changing. Group authoring software, like Lotus Notes, is widely used in organisations of many kinds, and, however sophisticated the document management record-keeping, it is still difficult, and probably ultimately pointless, and anachronistic, to attribute originality to one author. The argument, then, about contestability of author and text draws on a number of philosophical and critical traditions as well as on developments in information and communication technology. Getting the balance right is notoriously difficult. There are many signs of this. One lies in the emergence of new definitions of originality, departing from that conventional paradigm of authorship which emerged during the eighteenth century. A pressure point, sociologically, is the pressure to publish in most contemporary academic communities, and the trade-off between quantity and quality which leads at times to short cuts.
Another lies in multi-authorship techniques and strategies commonplace in literary, scientific and company communication. A third lies in the dynamics of the world of intellectual property, where, with the growth of electronic/digital communication, there have been growing attempts on the part of authors, publishers, rights owners and reproduction rights organisations to monitor, control and price electronic documentation and its use. The law is there but many institutions resist going to law because it takes decision making out of their own hands, and many would say that the law courts are not the proper place to evaluate the facts and implications of academic misconduct.
Paradoxically, in a world where texts appear to have more and more provisional identity, and can be jointly created and disseminated with greater ease, issues of control have attracted even greater attention. Gatekeeping and facilitating, again, appear to lie at the centre of the arena: authors, editors, teachers, academics, scientists, information and library specialists are all, in their way, both intermediaries as well as creators and consumers. Often their role includes (even enjoins) the need to facilitate, share information, induct newcomers to the discipline, provide guidance on the ethics of research and of citing sources, indicate the different claims of economic and moral selfinterest in intellectual property, and maintain/ safeguard intellectual and professional norms. With a plurality of roles, and a Janus-like intermediary role looking to both the interests of creators and consumers, it is no surprise that policies on plagiarism are sometimes ambivalent.
Contestability as a personal issue
There is a common belief that scientific research is objective and truthful. Even some of the notorious cases in recent years, like Darsee and Breuning, do not appear to have tarnished this general impression, despite a widespread loss of faith in technology as a panacea. Traditional safeguards like peerreview and academies of academic excellence have themselves come in for criticism, particularly where reviewing is closed. Writers like LaFollette (1992) have documented examples where reviewers have themselves shown bias or even used privileged information for their own purposes, delaying papers in the interests of furthering their own careers or using manuscript material/findings. Her investigation of US science concludes with the view that, even while new technology is altering communication between authors, and making information easier to store and check, that institutions are slow to move, often not transparent, and discussion is`b iased, secretive, legalistic, and ambiguous''. Famous hoaxes and unmaskings provide fuel for the popular imagination.
There is also a common belief that we all think alike about plagiarism and the concepts on which it is based and by which it is defined. Myers (1998) is one of many to alert us to the fact that, while most countries are signatories to international copyright conventions, there are many differences between cultures. Her analysis of the alleged plagiarism by Chinese students for work in the journal Science reveals how different cultural paradigms change definitions of plagiarism.
For them, from a culture where individual identity has a less individualistic role than in the capitalistic Western world, and where knowledge belongs to society rather than to individual selves, and where self-cultivation matters more than individualism, concepts of borrowing are themselves radically redefined. Psycholinguistic, social, and cultural factors change the context in which plagiarism is interpreted. In a global world, such collisions and contestable rhetorics compound the practical difficulties faced by administrators and teachers when they confront individual examples of academic misconduct.
Even legally, things are not simple. It might be thought that original copyrighted materials, reproducible under certain conditions like fair dealing/use, under licence or contract, so that multiple use and substantial part and non-commercial uses are all observed, would be straightforward enough. Plagiarism has a complex relationship with copyright and infringement. Copyright protects intellectual property, whether published or not, in public domain or not. Both copyright and plagiarism deal with materials produced by someone and wanted or used by someone else. As Mawdsley (1994) argues, copyright derives its identity from statutory law, while plagiarism is an academic concept defined and interpreted (mainly) by academic institutions (mainly since he cites numerous examples of where students have gone to law). He draws an important distinction between copyright and plagiarism by suggesting that``the emphasis in plagiarism is the conduct of the user, since generally no economic interest of the person whose work is copied is at stake''. Economic and legal factors are not hard to see in such a case ± the intellectual and economic investment in copyright material (the book, the article, the Website), the``harm'' arising from an abuse of fair dealing (particularly where commercial or even non-commercial look-alikes or reproductions are created), downloaded electronic information reformated or reframed for the borrower's own purposes. There may well be an economic interest in the case, even in situations where students plagiarise: the deception may provide advantage on the snakes-and-ladders board which is a university degree, and, where having the degree matters more than getting it (product rather than process), there is a distinct economic incentive to cut corners.
The critical point from Mawdsley's argument is that the conduct of the user matters. In an important way, plagiarism goes beyond fair dealing, which, for all its stipulations about amount and intended use, merely imposes legal sanctions on what can be done. It only distantly implies blame, while, as we have seen, the syndrome of reactions in plagiarism, by both perpetrators and people around them, as well as the plagiarised, takes in social, cultural, personal, and emotional factors. A good example of this is the book written by the poet Neal Bowers (1997) on learning that he was being systematically plagiarised. The anger and distress it caused him runs as a moving thread through his excellent account of his experience. For him, the law did not begin to help or resolve the dilemma, and his sense of having been contaminated, mispresented, and defamed remained long after the episode.
Conduct, then, seems central to our understanding of plagiarism. It draws on what we know about lying and deception in everyday life, in organisations, and in professional work. It links us to the desire for inclusion and the fear of exclusion. It presents the ambiguous moralities and opportunisms of often ordinary individuals placed in positions where momentary or inadvertent weakness kicks in. It may be deliberate, an intentional attempt to deceive, to steal and pass off, to bask in reflected and borrowed glory, to get one over on the system, to prove that the establishment is ineffective. Mallon's study (1989) is full of literary examples, from the days of Dryden and Milton up through the well-known example of Thomas's The White Hotel to Sokolow's plagiarism of Nissenbaum and the battle over original ideas on the screenplays for the TV series Falcon Crest.
What emerges from discussions like these is a strong sense of personal outrage, channelled at times through legal cool or the lens of retrospection, but nonetheless a feeling of wrong done. This is interesting, disinterested almost, in the sense that some of the moral outrage appears to be based on the view that, in a democratic society where individual values should be protected and where individual creative effort should be acknowledged and rewarded, literature and science, academic scholarly effort and the integrity of learning and educational institutions are all better for applying safeguards.
Some would see this as institutional structures, in the Foucauldian sense (where authority, discourse, and power are all concentrated in one place), protecting their own. But less sententious would be the view that all institutions and professional communities need to have effective mechanisms in place (and have to be seen to have them) to deal with matters like plagiarism.
So, in this sense, plagiarism is a personal matter, personal for the people involved (with all the anger, shame, betrayal, mud-sticking, defamation and reputation issues) as well as particular or idiosyncratic to the institutions and communities themselves. These would be the first to claim self-regulation, and many argue that, when matters like plagiarism go to law (e.g. on matters of discrimination or defamation), the issues cease to be matters of academic judgement and ethics. There are, too, ideals and aims in academic and professional life, reflected in mission statements and codes of professional conduct, which reflect the standards of personal and professional behaviour to which stakeholders are expected to aspire and conform.
A difficulty implied by postmodernism and deconstructionism is that of dissensus. This opposite of consensus suggests that establishing a common literary, scientific, legal, moral, professional standard is not easy. Changing views of authorship and the text are bringing with them radical ways of defining truth and identity, and with them delineating sanctions and equitable penalties.
The widespread availability of information makes use easy and detection difficult. Where there is no consensus on what is right and fair for any particular instance of plagiarism, despite explicit evidential documentation, it is difficult to legislate, even locally, on matters of theft and deliberate deception. It is always going to be easier to understand plagiarism than condone it. The popular imagination romanticises plagiarism, like hacking: it looks exciting, it is David against Goliath, it is Jack the Lad.
All the law and administration in the world will not remove plagiarism. Perhaps, defined as it is here, the removal of plagiarism is a contradiction in terms. Where it does, where it is seen to exist, in clear evidential terms, in instances of obvious copying and deliberate deceptions, then institutions have no choice: a university, for example, stands or falls on the integrity of its products (its awards) and its processes (e.g. fair accountability procedures). Ultimately, plagiarism is a personal matter. At social, institutional, and personal levels, plagiarism is very contestable, full of different meanings and values, contextbound and dependent on where and who we are at the time, often a matter of degree (e.g. when is a paraphrase a plagiarism?).
Legal definitions seem to help until economic ones appear, and then they fade as moral criteria begin to bite. There may be a bottom line ± and it is probably a moral one: would you plagiarise? How would you feel if you were the victim of plagiarism? What penalties, if any, would you impose upon plagiarists? Very much a matter, I think, for collaborative authorship.
